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By exploring the export performances and specialization patterns of China and India, we 
assess their trade competitiveness and complementarity vis-à-vis each other as well as with 
the rest of the world. Our analysis indicates that (i) India faces tough competition from 
China in the third markets especially in clothing, textile and leather products; (ii) there is a 
moderate potential for expanding trade between the two countries; (iii) China poses a 
challenge for the East Asian economies, the US, and most of the European countries 
especially in medium-technology industries; (iv) India appears to be a competitor mainly for 
its neighbouring South Asian countries; and (v) complementarity exists between the imports 
of China and India, and the exports of the US, some European states and East Asian 
countries, especially Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, implying 
opportunities for trade expansion; and finally (vi) the export structure of China is changing 
with the exports of skill intensive and high-technology products increasing and those of 
labour-intensive products decreasing gradually. This suggests that challenges created by 
China in traditional labour-intensive products might reduce in the long run.   
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1 Introduction 
In recent years China and India have experienced unprecedented economic 
development. During the last decade, China’s economy grew on average at 10 per cent 
per annum and India’s at 6 per cent per annum. China’s share in world trade increased 
from a meagre 1 per cent in early 1990s to 6 per cent in 2004 and that of India from 0.5 
per cent to 1 per cent during the same period. Although the share of China and India in  
global output and trade still lags behind their combined share of world population, this 
is expected to reverse in the future (Wilson and Purushothaman 2003; Ahya et al. 2004). 
By 2003, China became the sixth largest economy in the world at market exchange rate, 
the fourth largest global trader and the major recipient of foreign direct investment 
(Blazquez-Lidoy, Rodriguez and Santiso 2004).  
The ever increasing significance of the two most populous economies in the world has 
caused concerns about their growth and trade prospects and implications for other 
countries.1 According to IMF (2004), China’s rising shares in world output and trade 
are already having significant repercussions for countries all over the world. 
Eichengreen, Rhee and Tong (2004) show that Chinese exports crowd out exports of 
other Asian economies. This is especially true for consumer goods produced by less-
developed Asian countries, but not necessarily for capital goods produced by the more 
advanced Asian economies. Also, they find that China’s income elasticity of import 
demand is the highest for capital goods. Hence, the advanced Asian countries 
specializing in capital goods benefit from China’s rapid boom.  
Lall and Albaladejo (2004) examine China’s competitive threat to East Asia and 
conclude that China is a tough competitor in low-technology products. However, with 
imports outpacing exports, China also acts as an engine for export growth for its 
neighbours. Blazquez-Lidoy, Rodriguez and Santiso (2004) argue that China does not 
pose challenges for most Latin American countries, with Mexico as a notable exception. 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA) (2003, 2004) supports these findings and 
shows that China’s dominance as a global trade player entails adverse consequences for 
Mexico but presents opportunities for other Latin American countries. Jenkins and 
Edwards (2005) assess the impact of China and India’s economic growth and trade 
integration on Sub-Saharan Africa. They find that competition from China and India is 
not a serious concern for most countries in the region. However, Lesotho is threatened 
by the growing exports of textiles and garments from both countries. In addition, they 
observe that India poses much less of a competitive threat in third markets than China.  
In this paper, we extend the current literature by exploring systematic changes in China 
and India’s trade structure and analysing the impacts of their trade expansion on each 
                                                 
1   In the context of trade, three types of direct impacts are identified: (i) the complementarity effect—the 
growth of exports to China and India from the rest of the world due to an increase in demand in China 
and India; (ii) the competitiveness effect—increased competition from China and India for exports in 
the third markets, and (iii) the domestic competitive effect—increased competition with China and 
India in the domestic markets (Jenkins and Edwards 2005). In addition, a number of indirect effects 
are also possible, for example, the increased imports of China and India may have a multiplier effect 
and lead to growth in the demand for imports in the economies exporting to China and India. 
Ianchovichina and Martin (2003) and IMF (2004) estimate that the economic and technological 
spillovers from China and India may benefit the regional neighbours and trading partners in the long 
run, thereby promoting global economic growth.   2
other as well as on their major trading partners. Unlike earlier studies, our research is 
not confined to one particular region but offers a comprehensive assessment of the trade 
challenges posed by China and India on a global scale. In addition to competition, we 
assess trade complementarity to gauge the potential of increasing exports from other 
countries to meet the rising demands of China and India. To do so, we use the most 
recent available data on commodity trade at the three and four digit Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC) level. This complements earlier studies which 
use aggregated data and rely on computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. These 
studies have been criticized due to the high level of aggregation of sectors and countries 
and the various assumptions implicit in the calibration of key parameters.2 Finally, we 
examine the various impacts in terms of low-, medium- and high-technology industries, 
employing the technological classification of exports proposed by Lall and Weiss 
(2004). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the 
economic performance of China and India in recent years. Section 3 looks at their 
revealed comparative advantage and examines the changes in their trade structure in the 
last decade. Section 4 investigates the potential trade competition and complementarity 
between China and India. Section 5 assesses the challenges and opportunities posed by 
China and India to the rest of the world in third markets. Section 6 summarizes the main 
findings and concludes.  
2  China and India: the new Asian tigers 
China’s GDP per capita is now 2.2 times higher than India’s (in PPP terms) although 
per capita GDP in both countries was at comparable levels until the early 1990s. India’s 
performance has improved noticeably in the last few years and it has outperformed most 
of the other countries in its income group. The good macroeconomic performance of 
both countries is expected to continue and real GDP is expected to grow over 10 per 
cent in China and over 8 per cent in India in the short and medium terms (IMF 2007a).  
Economic liberalization reforms undertaken by both countries may have played an 
important role in triggering the high growth rates. This is because openness to trade 
provides access to imported inputs, new technology and larger markets and spurs 
growth (Harrison 1996; Frankel and Romer 1999). In recent years, international trade 
has grown manifold in China and India. China’s trade to GDP ratio increased from 32 
per cent in 1990 to 49 per cent in 2000 and further rose to 70 per cent in 2005. India’s 
trade liberalization has been more modest. Its trade to GDP ratio was close to 16 per 
cent in 1990, increasing to 29 per cent in 2000 and 44 per cent in 2005.  
The external balance position of India remained negative throughout the 1990s. This is 
in contrast to China, which has maintained a largely positive external balance since the 
early 1990s.3 The average annual growth rates of China’s and India’s exports of goods 
                                                 
2   See Gilbert and Wahl (2000) and Morrison (2001) for a review of CGE based studies on the impact of 
China’s trade on other countries. See Shafaeddin (2003, 2004) for a detailed discussion on the 
shortcomings of the CGE approach in the context of China’s trade liberalization. 
3   The average external balance of good and services as a percentage of GDP was 3 and -1.2 per cent for 
China and India, respectively, during 1990-2005.     3
and services were about 12 per cent in 1990-99, but jumped to 24 per cent and 17 per 
cent, respectively, in 2000-05. China’s imports increased on average at 16 per cent per 
annum in 1990-2005 while India’s imports increased at 13 per cent per annum. If the 
recent trend in exports is taken as an indicator of competitiveness, the overwhelming 
increase in the trade activity of both countries must have non-trivial consequences for 
the rest of the world (see Figure 1). 
Relative to India, China is much more integrated with the world economy and its share 
in global exports is nearly six times that of India. China’s exports to industrial countries 
as a percentage of its total exports increased from 35 per cent in 1990 to 52 per cent in 
2006 whereas the share of exports to developing countries decreased correspondingly. 
Interestingly, its imports from the developing countries increased during the same time 
period, suggesting that China is becoming a world factory for re-exports. India has 
experienced the opposite trend and its exports to industrial countries dropped from 55 
per cent in 1990 to 44 per cent in 2006 while the share of exports to developing 
countries has increased.   
In 2006, the main export markets for China were the United States (21 per cent of total 
exports), Hong Kong (10 per cent), and Europe (6 per cent). India’s leading export 
destinations were the US (17 per cent), the Middle East (15 per cent) and China (8 per 
cent). Table 1 presents the shares of China and India in the total imports of the US, 
Europe and Japan, the three big international markets. The rise in the share of imports 
from China is remarkable in the three regions. The share of imports from India 
increased slightly in the United States but declined in both Europe and Japan. The 
significant rise in China in the big markets has strengthened the fears of many 
developing and emerging countries that China is gaining dominance in the international 
markets at their expense and is directly responsible for crowding out their exports.   
The main reason behind China’s growing share in the global markets lies in its lower 
production costs due to an abundant labour force. Blazquez-Lidoy, Rodriguez and 
Santiso (2004) report that the average wage is three to four times lower in China than in 
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Note:  The size of the bubble represents the average annual GDP growth (%). 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on World Bank (2006).   4
Latin America. However, labour cost is not the whole story as China has higher labour 
costs than India. For example, in 2002, the typical monthly wage of a manufacturing 
worker in China was US$110.80 while it was only US$23.80 in India (Kalish 2006). 
Thus, other forces must be at work, including better infrastructure, flexible labour 
markets, and a favourable investment climate (Ahya et al. 2004). A high savings rate 
and fast capital accumulation explain a large proportion of China’s growth (IMF 2004). 
Another factor, possibly helping China’s exports, is an undervalued exchange rate. 
Advanced countries, especially the US, are increasingly demanding a revaluation of 
China’s exchange rate to contain their trade balances.    
In India, growth has been gradual and mainly driven by the private sector, which has 
seized the opportunities offered by the developed countries in the form of IT 
outsourcing. Its trade activity which remained subdued in the last decade has picked up 
in recent years, but the country has mainly relied on the exports of services for its 
foreign exchange earnings (Figure 2). Although China is the major recipient of foreign 
investment at present, India has a well-developed institutional framework in place, 
which includes property rights protection, a democratic political set-up, and the 
presence of various market regulators. Various surveys suggest that India has better 
corporate standards than China, which explains why the rate of return on assets has been 
higher and stocks performance better in India (Mund, Brandt and Hansankul 2005).  
Table 1 
Share of imports from China and India in total imports, 1980-2005 (%) 
 China  India  Japan 
  US Europe  Japan    US Europe Japan  US Europe  Japan   
1980-84  0.8 1.0 3.8  0.6 1.5 0.8  15.4 3.3  … 
1985-89  1.8 2.1 5.0  0.7 1.7 1.0  20.6 3.5  … 
1990-94  4.7 2.0 7.4  0.7 1.2 1.0  18.1 3.1  … 
1995-99 7.3  1.6  12.3  0.9 0.7 0.8  14.2 2.1  … 
2000-06 12.3  4.0  18.8  1.0 0.5 0.6  9.7 2.3  … 
Source:   Authors’ calculations based on IMF (2007b). 
Figure 2 
























Source:  World Bank (2006).   5
Like China, India enjoys the advantage of a large labour force and relatively low 
production costs. It possesses immense potential to increase its global market share.4 
Wilson and Purushothaman (2003) predict that if macroeconomic stability prevails, then 
high investment rates, a large labour force, and steady convergence would lead China to 
become the world’s largest economy by 2041 and its per capita income would be about 
US$ 30,000 by 2050. India’s growth rate could remain above 5 per cent throughout the 
next fifty years, outstripping Japan’s GDP by 2032 and achieving income per capita that 
is thirty-five times its current level, although still significantly lower than China’s in 
2050. Both countries are expected to become the driving force in global trade, with their 
exports rising from a combined 12 per cent of world exports to 20 per cent by 2010 and 
30 per cent by 2030 (Ahya et al. 2004).  
3  Trade structure of China and India 
To assess the potential impacts of the increasing international trade of China and India 
on each other as well as on the rest of the world, it is useful to examine their exporting 
structures as well as the changes in their export composition. For this purpose and other 
analyses, we use 1995-2005 data for merchandise trade from the United Nations 
COMTRADE database.5 Our dataset covers 260 and 613 product categories at the three 
and four-digit standard international trade classification (SITC) levels, respectively.  
Table 2 shows the top ten exporting sectors of China and India. For China, sectors with 
the highest shares of exports in 2005 were statistical and official machines, 
telecommunication and electronic equipment, clothing, footwear, furniture, and toys. 
These sectors constituted 43 per cent of total Chinese exports whereas their share was 
30 per cent in 1995. The evolution of the statistical, telecommunications, office, and 
consumer electronic equipment sectors is particularly impressive. Their combined share 
in total goods exports was about 6 per cent in 1995, rising to 13 per cent in 2000 and 25 
per cent in 2005. During the same period, the share of labour-intensive products such as 
clothing and footwear has decreased. This suggests that the Chinese export structure has 
changed towards medium to high-technology and capital-intensive products. 
The top ten exporting sectors of India constituted about 40 per cent of total exports of 
goods in 2005. Precious stones such as diamonds remain the leading export sector and 
constitute 13 per cent of total merchandise exports. The sectors which recorded a 
noticeable increase in their shares were iron ore and concentrates, and jewellery. 
Clearly, India’s leading exporting sectors have a high labour intensity and low capital 
intensity.  
China now has the highest share in world exports of clothing, leather, textiles and 
information technology (IT) and consumer electronic products (Table 3). It is also a 
 
                                                 
4   China and India account for 23 per cent and 17 per cent of the global working age population. By 
2010, China and India would add a further 56 and 83 million to the global labour supply. The 
contribution of the US and Europe would be only 13 million and 0.1 million, respectively, whereas the 
working population of Japan would decrease by about 3 million (Ahya et al. 2004). 
5   Ideally, trade profiles should be examined at a more disaggregated level. However, data unavailability 
prevents us from undertaking such analysis.      6
leading exporter of electrical and non-electrical machinery, and basic manufactures. 
India ranks among the top ten exporters of clothing, leather and textile products. 
However, its share in world exports of machinery and other manufactures is very low. 
 
Table 2 
Leading exporting sectors of China and India, 2005 (%) 
SITC 
code  Product group  1995 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004  2005
     China     
7143  Statistical machines cards or tapes 1.56  4.45  4.96  6.23 9.45  10.17  10.10 
7249  Telecommunications equipment, n. e. s.  2.15  4.10  4.91 5.13 5.52 6.78 7.65 
8411  Clothing of text fabric, not knitted crocheted  9.11  7.07  6.72 5.96 5.37 4.53 4.30 
8414 Clothing/accessories,  knitted  or  crocheted 4.84  5.52  5.20 5.00 4.84 4.47 4.19 
7149  Office machines, n. e. s.  1.09 2.37 3.19 4.26 4.41 4.23 3.89 
8911  Phonographs, tape & other sound recorders etc. 1.26  2.07  2.49 3.09 3.30 3.40 3.30 
7293  Thermionic valves and tubes, transistors, etc.  0.88  2.17  1.87 2.25 2.39 2.75 2.70 
8510 Footwear  4.24 3.83 3.67 3.31 2.88 2.48 2.44 
8210 Furniture  1.19 1.86 1.92 2.07 2.09 2.15 2.21 
8942  Children’ s toys, indoor games, etc. 3.32  3.20  2.90  3.11 2.59 2.07 2.05 
 Total  29.64  36.64  37.83 40.41 42.83 43.04 42.83 
     India     
6672  Diamonds (not industrial, not set or strung)  14.69  14.48  14.17 14.76 13.77 14.05 12.68 
8411  Clothing of text fabric, not knitted crocheted  8.18  8.27  7.08 6.25 5.43 4.66 5.51 
2813  Iron ore & concentrates ex roasted iron pyrites  1.64  0.84  1.02 1.73 1.87 4.20 4.15 
8971  Gold silver plat. etc jewellery ex watchcases 1.58  2.25  2.78 2.81 3.34 4.10 3.80 
8414  Clothing and accessories, knitted or crocheted  3.12  4.24  4.53 4.81 4.58 3.48 3.62 
5417 Medicaments  1.87 2.03 2.32 2.58 2.51 2.51 2.53 
6569  Made up articles of textile materials, nes  1.71  2.38  2.34 2.23 2.31 2.16 2.24 
5129  Other organic chemicals  0.37 1.03 1.12 1.23 1.64 1.63 1.85 
0422  Rice (glazed/ polished, not further prepared) 4.36  1.51  1.58 2.42 1.50 2.02 1.53 
6748  Other coated iron or steel plates etc under 3 mm 0.23  0.58  0.55 1.05 0.45 1.72 1.42 
 Total  37.74  37.59  37.49 39.87 37.38 40.54 39.33 
Note:  n. e. s. = Not elsewhere specified. 
Source:   Authors’ calculations based on UN COMTRADE database. 
 
Table 3 
Competitiveness in exports: world market share and rank, 2005 
 China    India 
   Share (%)  World rank    Share (%)  World rank 
Basic manufactures   8.50  2 (131)    1.32  25 (131) 
Chemicals  3.60  11 (131)    1.11  18 (131) 
Clothing  28.41  1 (115)    3.55  5 (115) 
Electronic components   9.53  4 (106)    0.27  33 (106) 
Fresh food  3.95  8 (177)    2.18  14 (177) 
IT & consumer electronics   22.84  1 (81)    0.08  40 (81) 
Leather products  24.49  1 (93)   2.33  10  (93) 
Minerals  1.38  22 (52)    1.85  17 (152) 
Miscellaneous manufacturing   12.41  2 (130)    0.87  25 (130) 
Non-electronic machinery  4.61  7 (116)    0.44  28 (116) 
Processed food  3.47  8 (153)    0.75  27 (153) 
Textiles  20.79  1 (118)    4.28  7 (118) 
Transport equipment  2.50  12 (110)    0.37  27 (110) 
Wood products  3.98  7 (120)    0.19  50 (120) 
Note:   Values in parentheses refer to the number of exporting countries ranked in the sector.  
Source:   UN COMTRADE database.   7
Table A1 in the Appendix presents the leading importing sectors of China and India. In 
China, the combined share of the top ten sectors was 47 per cent in 2005 and in India it 
was 53 per cent. Interestingly, we observe substantial overlaps between the leading 
export and import sectors of China, implying significant intra-industry trade. Clearly, 
China has turned into a regional production centre and manufacturing point for   
re-exports (Blazquez-Lidoy, Rodriguez and Santiso 2004). 
To assess structural changes in the exports of China and India, we compute the 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient (r) between sectoral export shares in t = 1995 with 
those in (t+1), (t+1),.…,(t+9). Values of r closer to zero indicate greater structural 
change whereas r values closer to one indicate the opposite. However, r tends to be 
influenced by outliers in the data and is an inappropriate measure for skewed 
distributions. Hence, we also measure similarity (S) in terms of ‘distance’ using the 
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where xj is the export share of sector j, t is the initial year (=1995) and k = 1,2….,9. BC 
is a bounded measure (0≤BC≤1) which is suitable for asymmetric distributions and is 
less sensitive to proportional sub-classification of sectors (Tajoli and De Benedictis 
2006).  
Figure 3, plotting r and S estimates, reveals three important trends. First, the export 
structures of both countries have changed, particularly in the past decade, as indicated 
by the decreasing values of r and S. Second, the structural change is more substantial in 
China. China’s r and S decreased from 1 to about 0.6 whereas India’s r and S decreased 
to 0.9 and 0.7, respectively. Third, the pace of change and movement away from initial 
specialization in China seem to have gained momentum since 2000—the slopes of the 
curves becoming much steeper as from 2000. This may reflect the fact that China 
accelerated structural change around 2001 when China joined the World Trade 
Organization.  
Figure 3 

















Source: Authors' calculations    8
To further explore the dynamics of specialization in China and India, we calculate the 
Balassa index of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) for the ten industrial clusters 







RCA = ,   (2) 
where xij and xwj denote the export of product j from country i and the total export of 
product j for the whole world, and Xi and Xw refer to the total exports of country i and 
the world total exports. This index compares the share of a sector in a country’s total 
export with the share of the same sector in world’s total exports. A value of RCA greater 
than unity indicates that the country specializes in a product j whereas a value of less 
than unity implies that the country has a revealed comparative disadvantage in product j. 
Figure 4 shows that China’s RCAs in labour-intensive products, and to a less extent in 
capital-intensive products and chemicals, have decreased over time. However, the RCA 
of machinery, which includes all types of electric, non-electric machinery and transport 
equipment, has increased. Interestingly, the RCAs for labour-intensive products have 
decreased in recent years in India as well. However, India’s RCAs for raw materials, 
chemicals and capital-intensive products have increased.7  
Figure 4 
RCA index of China and India by commodity groups, 1995-2005 
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Source: Authors’  computations  based on UN COMTRADE database. 
 
 
                                                 
6   The clusters are aggregates of over 2,200 products traded internationally. Table A1 in the Appendix 
presents the components of the clusters based on SITC codes. 
7   At the three digit SITC level, China and India had a RCA of greater than 1 in 89 and 84 sectors, 
respectively.   9
Figure 5 presents the RCA estimates compiled by UNCTAD. China has high RCA 
indices for a diverse range of sectors including clothing, leather and leather products, IT 
and consumer electronics, textiles, miscellaneous manufactures and electronic 
machinery. In fact, China ranks among the top twenty countries in the world in terms of 
RCA indices for these sectors (see www.intracen.org). India however has a revealed 
comparative advantage in textiles, clothing, fresh food, leather, minerals and basic 
manufactures. Thus, based on RCA, both countries appear to be strong competitors in 
the clothing, textiles and leather sectors. 
Figure 5 





































Source:  UN COMTRADE database. 
4  Trade competition and complementarity 
To assess the trade challenges posed by China and India to each other as well as to the 
rest of the world, we construct two well-known indices: the coefficient of specialization 


















,   (4) 
where  ni a  and  nj a  represent the share of good n in the total exports of countries i and j. 
If both countries (i, j) have the same exporting structure, then the indices are equal to 1, 
indicating intense competition. However, when both countries have totally dissimilar 
exporting structures, then both the indices are equal to 0, which indicates absence of 
competition.  
To assess the potential for expanding trade between two countries, we construct the 
trade complementarity index (TCI). TCI shows how well the export-import structures of   10












∑ ,   (5) 
where mni is the share of good n in total imports of country i. The index is zero when no 
goods exported by one country are imported by the other and 1 when the export and 
import shares are a perfect match. 
The above indices are compiled using the merchandise trade data for the major trade 
players in Africa, Asia, Latin America, North America, and western Europe. Together, 
these countries account for about 90 per cent of world trade in goods. Since 
disaggregated trade data are not available for many countries, the sample covers 52 
countries when three-digit trade data are used but only 44 countries at the four-digit 
level.8  
4.1  Trade competition and complementarity: China and India  
We first calculate CS and CC between China and India using data at both three- and 
four- digit levels. The results for the two indices do not differ much and reveal a high 
degree of competition between Chinese and Indian exports (see Table 4). However, the 
extent of competition seems to have weakened over time. This could be because China 
is increasingly specializing in IT and consumer electronics whereas India still 
specializes in textile and leather products.  
The obtained estimates for the TCI between China’s exports and India’s imports are 
reported in the third column of Table 6 whereas those between China’s imports and 
 
Table 4 
Trade competition between China and India, 1995-2005 
 Three-digit    Four-digit  Three-digit  Four-digit 
  CS  CC  CS  CC  TCI (China)  TCI (India)  TCI (China)  TCI (India) 
1995  0.48 0.40 0.46 0.46  0.32 0.29 0.27 0.27 
1996  0.46 0.41 0.44 0.48  0.34 0.27 0.28 0.25 
1997  0.45 0.39 0.43 0.46  0.34 0.29 0.28 0.28 
1998  0.44 0.35 0.42 0.44  0.29 0.27 0.25 0.27 
1999  0.44 0.31 0.42 0.39  0.30 0.26 0.26 0.26 
2000  0.45 0.34 0.43 0.43  0.32 0.28 0.29 0.27 
2001  0.45 0.32 0.43 0.40  0.33 0.30 0.29 0.28 
2002  0.43 0.27 0.41 0.34  0.33 0.30 0.30 0.29 
2003  0.43 0.25 0.41 0.30  0.34 0.31 0.31 0.31 
2004  0.40 0.19 0.39 0.23  0.35 0.31 0.33 0.31 
2005  0.39 0.20 0.39 0.25  0.35 0.31 0.33 0.32 
Average 0.44  0.32  0.42  0.38  0.34 0.29 0.30 0.28 
Source:   Authors’ calculations. 
                                                 
8   In general, trade indices are sensitive to aggregation bias and highly aggregated commodity groups 
yield higher values of the indices (Kellman and Schroder 1983).   11
India’s exports are presented in the last column. It is noted that the trade 
complementarity between the two countries has increased over time. Clearly, a 
moderate potential exists for both economies to expand the exchange of goods.9 India 
has a higher TCI, implying more opportunities for India to increase imports from China. 
For example, China is a leading exporter of telecommunications and computer 
equipment and India has a high share of imports of these products. Thus, India can 
enhance its imports of these items from China. Meanwhile, India possesses comparative 
advantages in a few resource-based industries such as aluminium, steel, agricultural 
commodities and paper that can be exported to China (Ahya et al. 2004).   
4.2  Trade competition and complementarity: China and India 
with the rest of the world  
We repeat the above exercise and compute the CS and CC of China and India with the 
other countries in the sample. The average value of the indices over 1995-2005 using 
three-digit data are presented in Figures 6 and 7. The estimates obtained from the four-
digit data do not differ significantly from these estimates, and are presented in Table A3 
in the Appendix. 
Figure 6 
Export competition between China and other countries, 1995-2005* 
 
Note:  * Export indices computed at the three-digit level; Reported values are period averages. 
Source:   Authors’ calculations. 
                                                 
9   Already, trade activity between China and India appears to have gained momentum and in the last 
decade alone, their bilateral trade increased from US$1 billion to US$14 billion.   12
Figure 7 
Export Competition between India and other countries, 1995-2005* 
 
Note:  * Export indices computed at the three-digit level; Reported values are period averages. 
Source:   Authors’ calculations. 
 
For China, the results reveal a high degree of competition with other East Asian 
countries such as Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and 
Vietnam. Among the Latin American countries, China is a tough competitor for Mexico 
whereas other Latin American countries including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Peru and Venezuela, are less likely to be affected. This is because the latter export 
commodities which are not exported but imported by China, for example, soybeans, 
iron ore, steel, soy oil and wood (Blazquez-Lidoy, Rodriguez and Santiso 2004). 
Among the industrial countries, Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, UK, and the US are the countries that face challenges from China’s 
expanding trade activity. However, in general, the African countries, especially those in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, are not affected.    
India appears to be a strong competitor for the European countries, for example, 
Belgium, Greece, Italy, and UK, and for other South Asian countries, including 
Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Most of the East Asian and Latin American 
countries face moderate competition from Indian exports whereas the African countries 
face no significant threat.  
As far as trade complementarity is concerned, Table 5 reports the average TCI of China 
and India with other countries computed based on the three-digit level data.10 Among 
                                                 
10  TCI estimates using the four-digit data are reported in Table A3 in the Appendix.   13
the East Asian countries, China has the highest TCI for Malaysia, Singapore, South 
Korea and Thailand. Among the industrial economies it has the highest TCI for 
Germany, UK and the US. In general, the trade complementarity between China and the 
South Asian countries (excluding India) and the African countries is quite low, whereas 
it is moderate for some of the Latin American countries. Latin American countries, 
particularly Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru, have a comparative advantage 
in fresh and processed food sectors, minerals, and wood products. Since China has a 
low RCA in these products, potential gains from trade expansion may be achieved in 
these sectors.  
India has relatively high trade complementarity with the European, East Asian and 
North American countries, and the lowest with the African countries and its 
neighbouring countries in South Asia. The TCI of India with Latin American countries 
ranges between 0.23 and 0.43, indicating a reasonable potential for trade expansion. 
In terms of the technological classification of products proposed by Lall and Weiss 
(2004), we notice that China has a high RCA in industries belonging to different 
 
Table 5 
Trade complementarity of China and India with rest of the world, 1995-2005 
  CHINA        INDIA     
Country  TCI Country  TCI  Country  TCI Country  TCI 
Argentina   0.32  Korea   0.55  Argentina   0.32  Korea   0.33 
Australia   0.35  Malaysia   0.48  Australia   0.37  Malaysia   0.34 
Austria   0.47  Mexico   0.43  Austria   0.31  Mexico   0.36 
Bangladesh   0.10  Morocco   0.20  Bangladesh   0.05  Morocco   0.17 
Belgium   0.45  Netherlands   0.48  Belgium   0.40  Netherlands   0.38 
Brazil   0.39  New Zealand   0.26  Brazil   0.32  New Zealand   0.22 
Cambodia   0.04  Niger   0.07  Cambodia   0.03  Niger   0.05 
Cameroon   0.12  Nigeria   0.05  Cameroon   0.33  Nigeria   0.27 
Canada  0.43 Norway    0.27  Canada  0.37 Norway    0.47 
Chile   0.18  Pakistan   0.15  Chile   0.17  Pakistan   0.10 
Colombia   0.24  Peru   0.18  Colombia   0.43  Peru   0.23 
Costa Rica   0.22  Philippines   0.33  Costa Rica   0.17  Philippines   0.19 
Denmark   0.41  Portugal   0.38  Denmark   0.34  Portugal   0.27 
Egypt   0.21  Singapore   0.47  Egypt   0.24  Singapore   0.33 
El Salvador   0.22  South Africa   0.35  El Salvador   0.16  South Africa   0.37 
Finland   0.42  Spain   0.41  Finland   0.30  Spain   0.34 
France   0.49  Sri Lanka   0.14  France   0.36  Sri Lanka   0.16 
Germany   0.53  Sudan   0.08  Germany   0.36  Sudan   0.13 
Ghana   0.09  Sweden   0.46  Ghana   0.16  Sweden   0.32 
Greece   0.33  Switzerland   0.43  Greece   0.28  Switzerland   0.28 
Hong Kong   0.39  Thailand   0.46  Hong Kong   0.22  Thailand   0.30 
Indonesia   0.37  UK  0.53  Indonesia   0.39  UK  0.43 
Iran   0.12  USA   0.56  Iran   0.34  USA   0.39 
Italy   0.47  Venezuela   0.17  Italy   0.33  Venezuela   0.36 
Japan   0.55  Vietnam   0.22  Japan   0.34  Vietnam   0.37 
Note:   TCI computed using three digit level SITC data; Reported values are period averages. 
Source:   Authors’ calculations   14
technology categories (low, medium and high) but not in resource based 
manufactures.11 In contrast, India has a RCA in resource based and low-technology 
industries. China’s main competitors, Hong Kong, Mexico and Thailand, have a RCA in 
broadly the same industries as China, whereas Japan, UK and USA specialize mainly in 
the medium- and high-technology products and have a high world market share in these 
categories (see Table A4 in the Appendix).  
Countries specializing in medium- to high-technology products may explore 
opportunities of expanding bilateral trade with India and those in resource based 
industries stand to benefit by the increasing demand of such products in China. For 
example, the growing economic activity in China and India is good news for oil 
exporting countries.12 In addition, as is evident from Table A2 in the Appendix, China’s 
leading imports also comprise medium- and high-technology products. Thus, countries 
like Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the US may gain by exporting their products to 
China.  
An interesting observation is that trade competition and complementarity of China and 
India vis-à-vis each other as well as with the rest of the world exhibit a changing 
pattern. For example, according to CS and CC, competition between China and India 
has decreased gradually over the past ten years. The same has occurred between China 
and some OECD countries including Australia, Norway and Switzerland. On the 
contrary, competition has increased between China and Japan or Singapore. For other 
countries such as the United States and United Kingdom, competition from China 
increased till late 1990s but has decreased in recent years.  
4.3  Competition in the third markets 
So far in our analysis we assumed that every country competes with others in the global 
market, and not in any specific third market. In reality, however, demand and supply 
patterns vary across different markets or countries/regions. Thus, it is important to 
analyse competition and complementarity in important third markets. To conduct this 
analysis, we consider three large markets that constitute some 50 per cent of the global 
trade: the US, European Union (EU) and Japan, and examine trade competition and 
complementarity from China and India faced by other countries in these markets.  
The estimated indices confirm that variations exist in the intensity of competition across 
the three markets.13 For example, the CS between China and India for exports to the 
US, EU, and Japan is 0.26, 0.30 and 0.20, respectively, suggesting that they are most 
competitive to each other in the European market. It is interesting to see that China’s 
                                                 
11  A potential limitation of the RCA Index is that it does not indicate whether the country in question has 
an advantage in the production or in the assembly operations of an item. Hence, some of the items 
grouped under the high-technology intensive category may be assembly plants involving final stages 
of the production process, which are in fact labour-intensive (Shafaeddin 2004).    
12  For example, China accounted for almost 40 per cent of the entire growth in the world demand for oil 
during 2000-03, becoming the second biggest consumer of oil (just behind the US) (CERA 2004). 
13  This holds for both data at three digit level as well as four digit level. For brevity reasons, we report 
the results for four digit data only. The three digit computations are available from the authors on 
request.   15
leading competitors in the three markets are Hong Kong, Malaysia, South Korea and 
Thailand (see Figures 8, 9 and 10). These countries appear to compete strongly in 
clothing, electronic, statistical and office machinery, and telecommunication and 
electronic equipment as they have a high share of these products in their total exports to 
Japan. In the US market, and to a lesser extent in the EU, Mexico faces tough 
competition from China. The product categories in which both countries compete 
include automotive parts, clothing, and telecommunication and electric equipment.   
For India, the leading competitor is Turkey in the US and the EU, while Sri Lanka, 
Morocco and Pakistan are its other major competitors, especially in the EU and 
Japanese markets. India competes with these countries mainly in clothing, jewellery, 
and textile made up articles. Overall, Latin American countries, except Mexico, face 
stronger competition from India vis-à-vis China in the three markets. These countries 
compete in raw materials, leather, footwear and textile sectors.   
Figure 8 






























































Note:   Export indices computed at the three-digit level. Reported values are period averages. 
Source: Authors’  calculations. 
Figure 9 




















































Note and sources: See Figure 8.   16
Figure 10 



























































Note and sources: See Figure 8. 
5  Conclusion and policy implications 
This paper focuses on the trade potential of China and India and assesses the impacts of 
their export growth on each other as well as on their major trade partners. The analysis 
reveals that the export structure of China is changing with the export shares of skill 
intensive and medium to high-technology products increasing and those of labour-
intensive products decreasing. These corroborate well with China’s decreasing 
comparative advantages in its traditional export sectors such as travel goods, footwear 
and apparel. Thus, the threat posed by China in labour-intensive products may reduce in 
the long run, thereby benefiting less-developed countries that are presently finding it 
hard to compete with China. These findings, however, must be interpreted with caution 
as they could attribute to the relocation of the labour-intensive production stages of 
high-technology products from industrial countries. Unavailability of highly 
disaggregated trade data prevents us from further exploring this issue. 
More specifically, China poses a tough challenge to India in low-technology industries, 
and to the EU, US and East Asia in medium- to high-technology industries. China’s 
competition with Latin American countries is moderate with the notable exception of 
Mexico, which has comparative advantage in product groups similar to China. China’s 
growing share in the US market appears to erode Mexico’s trade prospects. African 
countries are little affected by China’s trade expansion. 
India specializes in low-technology products and is a strong competitor for its 
neighbouring South Asian countries, who have a less diversified export base and enjoy 
comparative advantages in low-technology products. Some European countries and the 
US may also be affected by the increasing presence of India in global markets whereas 
the Latin American and African countries are least affected.   
Despite the challenges posed by China and India to each other, we find moderate 
complementarity in their export-import structures. This indicates a potential for further 
trade expansion between the two countries. Moderate to high complementarity also   17
exists between the imports of China and the exports of the East Asian countries, 
especially Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, the US, UK and Germany. 
These countries are expected to benefit from China’s growth if the complementarity in 
the trade structures can be enhanced and if they are able to further diversify their export 
bases. It is important to point out that trade competition and complementarity of China 
and India vis-à-vis each other as well as with the rest of the world have been changing 
over time. 
It is noted that the above conclusions are suggestive and do not represent any causation. 
Moreover, our findings should be interpreted with caution as they do not take into 
account the following important effects that the growing trade of China and India may 
have on the global economy. First, a rapid increase in the demand for energy and raw 
materials may push up prices, increasing price volatility, affecting different countries in 
different ways, and in the end dampening global growth. Second, an increasing demand 
for commodities, especially from China, may deepen the specialization in primary 
commodities of Latin American and African countries, increasing their exposure to real 
shocks and limiting prospects for growth. Third, if the growth dynamics in emerging 
and developing countries continue to rely on China’s growth, then a cooling down of 
Chinese economy might bring about a global slowdown. Finally, our analysis does not 
take into account trade in services which is becoming an increasingly important part of 
global commerce with China and India emerging as key players. Clearly, future research 
can extend our analysis and examine the extent of these effects on the global economy.  
References 
Ahya, C., A. Xie, A. Agarwal, D. Yam, S. Lam, and M. Sheth (2004). India and China: 
A Special Economic Analysis. Shanghai: Morgan Stanley. 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA) (2003). Latinwatch. Issue: June. Argentina: 
BBVA. 
BBVA (2004). Latinwatch. Issue: April. Argentina: BBVA. 
Blazquez-Lidoy, J., J. Rodriguez, and J. Santiso (2004). ‘Angel or Devil? Chinese Trade 
Impact on Latin American Emerging Markets’. Washington, DC: Center for Latin 
America, Georgetown University. 
Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA) (2004). Riding the Tiger: The Global 
Impact of China’s Energy Quandary. Cambridge, MA: CERA. 
Eichengreen, B., Y. Rhee, and H. Tong (2004). ‘The Impact of China on the Exports of 
Other Asian Countries’. NBER Working Paper 10768. Cambridge, MA: National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 
Frankel, J. A., and D. Romer (1999). ‘Does Trade Cause Growth?’. American Economic 
Review, 89 (3): 379-99. 
Gilbert, J., and T. Wahl (2000). ‘Applied General Equilibrium Assessments of Trade 
Liberalization in China’. Paper presented at the Workshop on China’s Access on to 
the WTO: An Overview of Recent Analyses, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic 
Policy Analysis and Institute of Qualitative and Technical Economies of the Chinese 
Academy of Social Science, 19-20 October. Beijing.    18
Harrison, A. (1996). ‘Openness and Growth: A Time-Series, Cross-Country Analysis 
for Developing Countries’. Journal of Development Economics, 48 (2): 419-47. 
Ianchovichina, E., and W. Martin (2003). ‘Economic Impacts of China’s Accession to 
the World Trade Organization’. WB Policy Research Working Paper 3053. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
IMF (International Monetary Fund) (2004). World Economic Outlook, April 2004. 
Washington, DC: IMF.  
IMF (2007a). World Economic Outlook, September 2007. Washington, DC: IMF. 
IMF (2007b). Direction of Trade Statistics 2007. Washington, DC: IMF. 
Jenkins, R., and C. Edwards (2005). ‘The Effect of China and India’s Growth and Trade 
Liberalization on Poverty in Africa’. Report prepared for Department for 
International Development (DfID). London: DfID.  
Kalish, I. (2006). ‘China and India: The Reality beyond Hype’. Deloitte Research 
Study. Available at: www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/content/DTT DR CH 
inaIndiaRealityBeyondtheHype 0520067.pfd 
Kellman, M., and T. Schroder (1983). ‘The Export Similarity Index: Some Structural 
Tests’. The Economic Journal, 93 (369): 193-98. 
Lall, S., and M. Albaladejo (2004). ‘China’s Competitive Performance: A Threat to East 
Asian Manufactured Exports?’. World Development, 32 (9): 1441-66.  
Lall, S., and J. Weiss (2004). ‘People’s Republic of China’s Competitive Threat to Latin 
America: An Analysis for 1990-2002’. ADB Institute Discussion Paper 14. Manila: 
Asian Development Bank.    
Leamer, E. (1984). Sources of International Comparative Advantage: Theory and 
Evidence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Leamer, E. (1995). ‘The Heckscher-Ohlin Model in Theory and Practice’. Princeton 
Studies in International Finance 77. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University.  
Morrison, W. (2001). Summaries of Studies of the Impact of WTO on China’s Trade. 
Centre for Cooperation with Non-members, Organization of Economic Cooperation 
and Development. Paris: OECD. 
Mund, J. A., N. Brandt, and S. Hansakul (2005). China & India: A Visual Essay. 
Frankfurt: Deutsche Bank Research.   
Shafaeddin, S. M. (2003). ‘Some Implications of Accession to WTO for China’s 
Economy’. International Journal of Development Issues, 1 (2): 93-128. 
Shafaeddin, S. M. (2004). ‘Is China’s Accession to WTO Threatening Exports of 
Developing Countries?’. China Economic Review, 15 (2):109-44. 
Tajoli, L., and L. De Benedictis (2006). ‘Economic Integration and Similarity in Trade 
Structures’. FEEM Working Paper 2006-54. Milan: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. 
Wilson, D., and R. Purushothaman (2003). ‘Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050’. 
Global Economic Paper 99. London: Goldman Sachs. 
World Bank (2006). World Development Indicators 2006. Washington, DC: World 
Bank. 
United Nations (nd). COMTRADE Database. Available at: comtrade.un.org .   19
Appendix 
Appendix Table A1 
Leading import sectors in China and India, 1995-2005 (%) 
SITC 




































      China      
7293  Thermionic valves and tubes, transistors, etc.  1.82 6.71 4.86 4.39 4.87 6.15 7.35
3310  Petroleum, crude & partly refined  0.06 0.46 0.65 1.60 3.16 4.25 4.75
8613  Binoculars, microscopes & other optical instruments 4.49 4.56 4.63 3.84 3.82 3.66 3.74
7249  Telecommunications equipment nes  4.55 4.54 4.54 4.08 3.39 3.27 3.26
5812  Products of polymerization & copolymerization  0.95 0.84 1.04 0.95 1.19 2.30 2.83
2813  Iron ore & concentrates ex roasted iron pyrites  1.46 2.45 2.62 2.71 2.71 2.71 2.82
7222  Apparatus for electrical circuits  0.81 2.04 2.08 2.31 2.81 2.62 2.78
7143  Statistical machines cards or tapes  1.17 2.59 2.95 3.34 3.00 2.64 2.55
7149  Office machines, nes  4.74 2.33 2.44 2.48 2.28 2.46 1.78
7198  Machinery and mechanical appliances, nes  3.00 9.55 9.85 12.09 12.92 13.50 14.68
 Total  23.05 36.07 35.66 37.78 40.16 43.57 46.56
      India      
3310  Petroleum, crude & partly refined   10.76 32.03 27.97 28.70 26.95 27.74 29.23
6672  Diamonds, not industrial, not set or strung  6.41 10.44 9.84 10.68 10.05 9.75 6.72
7249  Telecommunications equipment nes  0.90 1.35 1.76 3.53 4.29 4.22 4.40
7341  Aircraft, heavier than air  0.68 0.33 0.26 1.13 1.09 1.21 3.23
3214  Coal /anthracite, bituminous/  2.51 1.96 2.06 1.84 1.56 2.13 2.53
3411 Gas,  natural  0.42 0.45 0.36 0.55 0.77 1.46 1.71
7143  Statistical machines cards or tapes  0.61 1.58 1.27 1.45 1.58 1.55 1.57
7171 Textile  machinery  2.19 0.63 0.62 0.73 0.73 0.78 1.19
2820  Iron & steel scrap  1.24 0.66 0.91 0.62 0.77 1.10 1.19
7149  Office machines, nes  0.58 1.59 1.46 1.27 1.25 1.19 1.08
 Total  26.29 51.03 46.51 50.50 49.04 51.13 52.85
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Appendix Table A2 
Leamer’s industrial clusters 
Clusters SITC  Clusters  SITC 
Petroleum 




Nonmetal minerals  
Furniture  
Travel goods and handbags  
Art apparel  
Footwear  
Miscellaneous manufactured articles  
Postal packaging, not classified 
Special transactions, not classified  














Crude fertilizers/minerals  
Metalliferrous ores  
Coal and coke  
Gas (natural/manufactured)  













Textile yarn and fabric  
Iron and steel  
Manufactured metal n. e. s.  










Lumber, wood, and cork  
Pulp and waste paper  








Power generating  
Specialized  
Metalworking  
General industrial  
Office and data processing  
Telecommunications and sound  
Electrical  
Road vehicles  
Other transportation vehicles  
Professional and scientific instruments  
Photographic apparatus  































Dyeing and tanning  
Medical and pharmaceutical products  
Essences and perfumes  
Fertilizers  
Explosives and pyrotechnics  
Artificial resins and plastics 













Live animals  
Meat  
Dairy products  
Fish  
Hides and skins  
Crude animals and vegetables  
Processed animal and vegetable oils  
















Oil seeds  
Textile fibres  
Animal oil and fat  










Notes:   n. e. s. = Not elsewhere specified. 
Source:   Leamer (1995).   21
Appendix Table A3 
Trade competition and complementarity of China and India, 1990-2005 
  CS CC CS CC  TCI  (China)  TCI  (India) 
Argentina 0.20  0.09  0.25 0.12  0.29  0.29 
Australia 0.23  0.13  0.25 0.13  0.32  0.32 
Austria 0.38  0.31  0.32 0.25  0.44  0.33 
Bangladesh 0.30  0.44 0.32 0.50  0.27  0.23 
Brazil 0.22  0.15  0.25 0.18  0.28  0.23 
Cameroon 0.05  0.06  0.06 0.03  0.11  0.29 
Canada 0.30  0.16  0.25 0.12  0.40  0.37 
Chile 0.13  0.03  0.14 0.04  0.14  0.13 
Hong Kong  0.67  0.84  0.37 0.33  0.49  0.26 
Colombia 0.23  0.15  0.24 0.10  0.22  0.34 
Costa Rica  0.28  0.28  0.24 0.13  0.21  0.15 
Denmark 0.40  0.40  0.31 0.23  0.38  0.34 
Egypt 0.21  0.15  0.28 0.15  0.16  0.19 
El Salvador  0.25  0.17 0.27 0.18  0.18  0.11 
Finland 0.29  0.33  0.22 0.06  0.39  0.29 
France 0.14  0.11  0.11 0.06  0.22  0.16 
Greece 0.34  0.45  0.33 0.31  0.29  0.23 
Indonesia 0.14  0.12  0.13 0.06  0.16  0.34 
Italy 0.47  0.55  0.40 0.33  0.43  0.32 
Japan 0.37  0.31  0.26 0.11  0.55  0.35 
Kenya 0.26  0.21  0.24 0.11  0.26  0.17 
Korea 0.45  0.45  0.30 0.12  0.54  0.30 
Malaysia 0.40  0.44  0.22 0.07  0.47  0.31 
Mexico 0.47  0.47  0.27 0.15  0.41  0.36 
Morocco 0.29  0.49  0.27 0.37  0.16  0.12 
Netherlands 0.42  0.53 0.32 0.16  0.46  0.35 
New Zealand  0.05  0.05 0.05 0.01  0.10  0.22 
Norway 0.18  0.09  0.15 0.03  0.24  0.43 
Pakistan 0.27  0.40  0.33 0.42  0.12  0.07 
Peru 0.20  0.15  0.20 0.12  0.16  0.13 
Philippines 0.37  0.35  0.22 0.09  0.31  0.16 
Portugal 0.18  0.09  0.18 0.08  0.28  0.43 
Singapore 0.37  0.35  0.26 0.15  0.44  0.31 
Spain 0.35  0.20  0.28 0.13  0.34  0.26 
Sri Lanka  0.23  0.38  0.26 0.41  0.11  0.13 
Sweden 0.33  0.31  0.27 0.15  0.42  0.33 
Switzerland 0.30  0.20 0.28 0.24  0.39  0.30 
Thailand 0.52  0.62  0.39 0.29  0.44  0.27 
Turkey 0.43  0.59  0.43 0.42  0.26  0.20 
United Kingdom  0.42  0.42 0.32 0.28  0.51  0.42 
USA 0.41  0.41  0.31 0.19  0.55  0.39 
Venezuela 0.10  0.06  0.10 0.01  0.16  0.32 
Viet Nam  0.24  0.18  0.24 0.24  0.23  0.31 
Note:   CS, CC and TCI constructed using four-digit SITC data; Reported values are period averages. 
Source:   Authors’ calculations. 
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Appendix Table A4 
RCA index and world market share in different sectors, 2004 
 Hong  Kong  Japan  Mexico  Thailand  UK  USA 
   RCA  index 
Basic manufactures  0.50 0.99 0.69 0.60 0.81 0.63 
Chemicals   0.43  0.87 0.34 0.65 1.41 1.18 
Clothing   3.01  0.00  1.29 1.56 0.43 0.23 
Electronics 1.94  1.64  1.53 1.55 0.63 1.33 
Fresh food  0.23  0.00  0.8  2.33 0.40 1.52 
IT/Consumer elect.  2.33  1.2  1.75 2.11 1.01 0.92 
Leather products  4.12  0.00 0  1.40 0.34 0.00 
Minerals   0.17  0.00  1.06 0.36 1.08 0.35 
Misc. manufactures  2.01  1.01 1.07 1.01 1.23 1.31 
Non-elect. machinery  0.46 1.71 0.84 0.62 1.39 1.38 
Processed food   0.19  0.00 0.56 1.71 1.14 0.75 
Textiles   2.28  0.55  0.49 0.79 0.56 0.61 
Transport equipment  0.08  2.03 1.34 0.37 1.07 1.22 
Wood products  0.39  0.19 0.26 0.66 0.48 0.93 
    World market share (%) 
Basic  manufacture  1.60      1.60 0.70 3.50 6.60 
Chemicals 1.40  5.60  0.80 0.70 6.10  11.70 
Clothing  9.60    3.00 1.80 1.80 2.30 
Electronic items  6.20  10.50 3.60 1.80 2.70  13.10 
Fresh food  0.70    1.90 2.70 1.70  15.00 
IT/consumer elect.  7.40  7.70 4.10 2.40 4.40 9.10 
Leather products  13.80 6.30    1.70 1.50   
Minerals  0.50    2.50 0.40 4.70 3.50 
Misc. manufactures  6.40  6.50 2.50 1.20 5.30  12.90 
Non-elect. machinery  1.50  11.00 2.00 0.70 6.00  13.60 
Processed food  0.60    1.30 2.00 4.90 7.50 
Textiles 7.30  3.60  1.20 0.90 2.40 6.00 
Transport equipment  0.30  13.00 3.20 0.40 4.60  21.00 
Wood products  1.20  1.20 0.60 0.80 2.10 9.20 
Source:  UN COMTRADE database.  
 